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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS, : 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
VS. 1 
REAL ESTATE DIVISION, : 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS : 
REGULATIONS, STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondent. 
: Case No. 
: Category 
890021-CA 
RE87-08-02 
No. 14a 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 63-46(b)-l6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
T h i s i s a P e t i t i o n fo r Review of F i n d i n g s of F a c t , 
Conclusions of Law and a Recommended Order wherein J . Steven 
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, recommended the revocation of 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s P r i n c i p a l B r o k e r ' s License c o n s i s t e n t with the 
provisions of Sect ion 6 1 - 2 - 1 2 ( 1 ) ( f ) . The recommendation was 
dated December 14, 1988. A Pe t i t ion for Review was f i led by the 
p e t i t i o n e r on January 12, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I . Did the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge e r r in deny ing 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of the respondent, 
which Motion asser ted tha t the respondent 's action was barred by 
1 
the Statute of Limitations? 
II. Is there sufficient evidence to sustain the Conclusions 
of Law and Order of the Administrative Law Judge? 
III. Is the recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge 
inequitable and harsh under the circumstances of this case? 
STATUTES 
Section 61-2-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Section 61-2-12(1)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Rule 9(a)(7), Rules of Real Estate Commission. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for Review of a ruling by J. Steven 
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge wherein petitioner's Principal 
Real Estate Broker's License was revoked. The action was 
initiated by the Real Estate Division in a Petition dated 
November 25, 1987, as Case No. RE87-08-02. On June 13, 1988, 
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon a claim that the 
action of the Real Estate Commission was barred by the Statute of 
Limitations. Said motion was denied and the matter was set for 
hearing on September 20, 1988. 
The following are the facts found by the Administrative Law 
Judge on or after the September 20, 1988 hearing. 
1. Sometime in 1973, Respondent became licensed 
as a sales agent by the Division of Real Estate. As 
relevant herein, Respondent was affiliated with 
principal broker David R. Harman as of January 1982. 
On September 1, 1982, she terminated her affiliation 
with Mr. Harman and became affiliated with principal 
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broker A. J. Michaels. In late 1982 or early 1983, 
she terminated her affiliation with Mr. Michaels and 
became affiliated with K. M. Woolley & Company. 
2. By Order, dated August 17, 1983, Respondent's 
license was suspended for one year and thereafter 
placed on probation for two years, subject to certain 
terms and conditions. Said order was based on conduct 
which occurred between December 10, 1981 and August 22, 
1982. Respondent's conduct in that regard was found to 
constitute gross incompetence and a violation of the 
fiduciary duty owed to her clients in that transaction. 
Respondent subsequently became licensed as a principal 
broker on January 15, 1987. 
3. In January, 1982, a Barbara Homeyer contacted 
Respondent to obtain her services in purchasing a home. 
Ms. Homeyer, who was recently divorced, resided in a 
home jointly owned by herself and her ex-husband. 
Since there had been no property settlement relative 
to her divorce and Ms. Homeyerfs ex-husband was 
reluctant to cooperate as to the sale of their home, 
the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer to provide a 
down payment on the purchase of another home consisted 
of various items of inherited personal property. 
4. During January 1982, Ms. Homeyer and Respondent 
entered into a verbal agreement, whereby Respondent 
was to act as Ms. Homeyer's real estate agent and 
attempt to find a prospective seller who would accept 
Ms. Homeyerfs personal property as down payment for the 
purchase of a home. On February 21, 1982, respondent 
and Ms. Homeyer inventoried her property. Ms. Homeyer 
then delivered that property to respondent, which was 
held in storage under respondent's control. The 
property was so transferred to respondent as the means 
to provide a safe place for its storage and facilitate 
respondent's access to that property if a prospective 
seller was located. 
5. Between February and late-April 1982, 
respondent and Ms. Homeyer identified at least two 
properties for possible purchase. In one instance, an 
agreement could not be reached as to those items of Ms. 
Homeyer's personal property which would be acceptable 
in lieu of a cash down payment. When it became 
apparent to Ms. Homeyer that no other purchase on the 
above-described terms would be realized, she authorized 
respondent to sell certain items as the means to 
provide cash for the down payment necessary to purchase 
a home. 
6. During March and April 1982, respondent had 
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some of Ms. Homeyerfs property appraised and certain 
items were sold in antique shows. However, as of late 
April 1982, no progress in locating a suitable home had 
been realized, Ms. Homeyer had received no monies from 
respondent relative to the sale of some of her property 
and respondent had taken certain property from storage 
and sold it without Ms. Homeyerfs authorization. 
Further, respondent never advised her principal broker 
of her activities nor did she deliver to him any of the 
funds she obtained from the sale of Ms. Homeyer Ts 
property. 
7. In late-April or early May 1982, Ms. Homeyer 
underwent foot surgery and was advised that her 
condition could be cancerous. At the time, it was 
unknown if a suitable home would be found and whether 
that would occur prior to her possible death. On May 
5, 1982, Ms. Homeyer met with respondent and they 
executed a written agreement, whereby the former 
assigned all of her personal property to respondent for 
sale and/or exchange and authorized respondent to 
liquidate that property. The agreement further 
provided that if all property held by respondent was 
not liquidated prior to Ms. Homeyerfs death, the 
remaining funds would be placed in trust for the 
benefit of her two minor children. 
8. During the next two months, Ms. Homeyer was 
never advised as to the status of her property and was 
unable to contact respondent in that regard. In mid-
July 1982, Ms. Homeyer retained counsel and made 
written demand that respondent return all personal 
property in her possession and provide an accounting as 
to the sale or other disposition of the remaining 
property which had been in her possession. 
9. By letter, dated October 21, 1982, respondent 
generally informed Ms. Homeyer as to efforts which had 
been undertaken to appraise, restore, and/or sell some 
of the property in her possession. Respondent further 
mentioned various costs incurred as to the appraisal 
and restoration of that property. Respondent also 
reiterated that her efforts had been undertaken to 
produce funds necessary for a down payment for a home 
or condominium, but she acknowledged that no suitable 
residence had yet been identified. Respondent 
requested Ms. Homeyer to keep her posted "about what 
you want to do with the housing thing" and she advised 
Ms. Homeyer of a listing for a two bedroom townhouse 
duplex and pondered that Ms. Homeyer could live in one 
side and rent the other. 
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10. By letter, dated October 28, 1982, Ms. 
Homeyer advised respondent that purchase of the duplex 
would not be economically feasible and reiterated that 
no accounting had been received as to the status of her 
property or any disposition thereof. By letter, dated 
October 29, 1982, a second demand was made that 
respondent return all items of personal property 
entrusted to her. When compliance with that demand was 
not forthcoming, Ms. Homeyer initiated litigation. No 
accounting was provided to Ms. Homeyer until July 9, 
1986, when respondent returned certain items pursuant 
to a writ of replevin. 
11. By stipulation, dated October 7, 1986, Ms. 
Horaeyer and respondent identified the status of some of 
the property which had been in respondent's possession. 
That property consisted of guns, cameras, furs, clocks 
and watches, a coin collection, silver, jewelry, 
flatware, china, pewter, furniture, household and other 
miscellaneous items. The value of the property which 
respondent sold was agreed to have been $6,530.50 and 
respondent received $4,495.00 from the sale of that 
property. It was agreed that certain property, valued 
at $6,799.50, was delivered by respondent to third 
parties and that said property had not been recovered 
by Ms. Horaeyer. It was also agreed that certain 
property still in respondent's possession should be 
valued at $4,820.50. 
12. Some of the property which Ms. Homeyer had 
delivered to respondent was subsequently returned to 
her. However, in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, dated October 30, 1986, the Court concluded that 
respondent had sold some of the property below fair 
market value, had interfered with Ms. Horaeyer's 
possession and control of some of the property by 
intentionally refusing to return it and had converted 
the proceeds from the sale of some of the property to 
her own use. By reason thereof, the Court entered 
judgment on October 30, 1986 in favor of Ms. Homeyer 
totaling $2,035.50 as a result of respondent's breach 
of contractual and fiduciary duties to Ms. Homeyer, 
$4,495.00 as a result of respondent's conversion of 
proceeds from the sale of the property, $6,799.50 as a 
result of respondent's conversion of property upon 
transferring that property to others and $4,820.50 as a 
result of respondent's conversion of property still in 
her possession. 
13. In the above-referenced Findings of FAct, the 
court also noted that Ms. Homeyer had initiated 
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bankruptcy proceedings on July 22, 1985 and that 
respondent had been listed as a creditor in said 
proceedings* The Court further noted that an order was 
entered in those proceedings on October 30, 1985, 
whereby Ms. Horaeyer was discharged of all claims, 
including those of respondent relative to expenses she 
incurred in her efforts to repair, restore and dispose 
of Ms. Homeyer's property. The instant record also 
reflects that respondent initiated bankruptcy 
proceedings in 1981 and that after entry of the October 
30, 1986 judgment, an order was entered in those 
bankruptcy proceedings relative to respondent, whereby 
the just-stated judgment was discharged. 
After hearing the case on September 20, 1988, Judge J. 
Steven Eklund concluded that petitioner had entered into and 
remained in a real estate transaction and contractual 
relationship with Barbara Homeyer and that her conduct during the 
term of the contract, which terminated in the late fall of 1982, 
constituted a violation of the provisions of the Real Estate 
Licensure Act and the Rules propounded to enforce the act. Judge 
Eklund recommended and ordered revocation of petitioner's real 
estate license. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On November 25, 1987, a Petition to revoke the principal 
broker's license of Juanita Taft Rogers was filed. The petition 
alleged acts of Rogers which occurred more than five (5) years 
previously. This Court should enforce a Statute of Limitations, 
against the Real Estate Division and should reverse the decision 
of the Administrative Law Judge to deny petitioner's Motion to 
Dismiss based upon the Statute of Limitations. All the actions 
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complained of by the Real Estate Commission against Juanita Taft 
Rogers relate to events which occurred in the year 1982 or 
earlier. After a period of suspension, petitioner, Juanita Taft 
Rogers, applied for and received from the Real Estate Division a 
principal broker's license and has practiced in the field of real 
estate sales without any suggestion of a threat to the interests 
of the public at large. The two real estate transactions, if 
they were real estate transactions for which the petitioner 
either was suspended or is presently subject to revocation were 
bizarre, unusual and unique in the real estate field and were 
handled reasonably by petitioner. Petitioner's present actions 
and activities as a principal real estate broker do not 
constitute a danger to the public at large and she is capable and 
competent to continue in the real estate practice. Revocation 
of her license is much to harsh. 
The May 5, 1982 agreement between petitioner and Barbara 
Horaeyer constituted a new agreement for services unrelated to the 
real estate field and was simply an authorization and agreement 
for petitioner to act as a liquidator of property of Barbara 
Homeyer. The Court erred in construing the May 5, 1982 agreement 
as a real estate contract, listing agreement or otherwise. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PETITION OF THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION DATED NOVEMBER 25, 1987, 
SEEKING TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE THE LICENSE OF PETITIONER JUANITA 
TAFT ROGERS IS BARRED BY LATCHES OR THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The action brought by the Real Estate Division against the 
principal broker's license of Juanita Taft Rogers is in its 
nature "civil." Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states: "There shall be one form of action to be known as civil 
action.'" The words "civil action" are defined in general as: 
An action wherein an issue is presented for trial 
formed by averments of complaint and denials of answer 
or replication to new matter, White v. White, 98 Ind. 
App. 587, 186 N.E. 349; an adversary proceeding for 
declaration, enforcement or protection of a right, 
redress, or prevention of a wrong, People v. Barker, 29 
Cal. App. 2d Supp. 766, 77 P.2d 321 ; Lee v. LangT 140 
Fla. 782, 192 S.O. 490; Johnston v. State, 212 Ind. 
375, 8 N.E. 590. Every action other than a criminal 
action, City of Neena v. Krueger, 206 Wis. 473, 240 
N.W. 402. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed. 
1968. 
In the civil law, a civil action is a personal action which 
is instituted to compel payment, or the doing of some other thing 
which is purely civil. At common law, a civil action is one 
which seeks the establishment, recovery, or redress of private 
and civil rights. It is an action brought to recover some civil 
right, or to obtain redress for some wrong not deemed a crime or 
misdemeanor. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed. 1968. 
Clearly the kind of action brought by the Real Estate 
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Division against the principal broker's license of Juanita Taft 
Rogers can be characterized as "civil." Section 78-12-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is the codification of the 
Statute of Limitations for the State of Utah and States as 
follows: 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action 
has accrued, except in specific cases where a different 
limitation is prescribed by statute* 
Section 61-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
contain the provisions of law adopted in the State of Utah 
regulating the Securities Commission and the Real Estate 
Division. Nowhere in Section 61-1 of the Utah Code is there 
located a separate Statute of Limitations clause pertaining to 
affairs or enforcements efforts of the Real Estate Division. On 
the other hand, actions brought in the name of or for the benefit 
of the State are subject to the provisions of Section 78-12 et 
seq., Utah Code Annotated. Specifically, Section 78-12-33 
provides: 
The limitations prescribed in this article shall apply 
to actions brought in the name of or for the benefit of 
the State in the same manner as to actions by private 
parties. 
Thus, unless the real estate statutes under Title 61 Chapter 
1 provide for a different period of limitation or make provision 
in some regard with respect to the limitations of actions by the 
Real Estate Division, then the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 12 
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prescribe the appropriate limitation of actions controlling the 
Real Estate Division. In that regard, Section 78-12-25 provides 
as follows: 
Within four years: 
... (2) An action for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has construed sub-section 2 of 78-12-
25 to apply to al actions, legal or equitable where plaintiff 
seeks affirmative relief. Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 
296, 153 P. 995 (1915). The Supreme Court has also stated that 
the Statute of Limitation under 78-12-25(2) provides a catch-all 
provision for actions not otherwise provided for by law. Holm v. 
B. & M. Service, Inc., 661 P.2d 951 (Utah 1983). This provision 
of the Statute of Limitation provides the longest period of 
limitation within which the Real Estate Division could 
conceivably bring its action. All other applicable provisions of 
the statute of limitations are shorter than the four (4) years. 
The longer limitation periods prescribed in Title 78, Chapter 12 
have no application to the action being taken by the real estate 
division against the principal broker's license of petitioner 
Juanita Taft Rogers. A thorough reading of all of the other 
chapters contained in Title 78 of the Utah Code will disclose 
that there is not a specific provision describing a licensure 
revocation such as the one brought here by the real estate 
division. Thus, such action by the Real Estate Division clearly 
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falls within the provisions of the catch-all limitation as set 
forth in Section 78-12-25(2). That being the case, the Division 
of Real Estate was more than a year beyond the Statute of 
Limitations when it filed its petition for revocation or 
suspension of the principal broker's license of Juanita Taft 
Rogers. Accordingly said petition should have been dismissed 
and the action barred when the matter was addressed pursuant to 
petitioner Rogers motion to dismiss filed herein. 
A reading of the November 25, 1987 petition filed by the 
Real Estate Division discloses that all of the acts alleged to 
have been committed by Juanita Taft Rogers giving rights to a 
revocation or suspension of her license occurred before November 
of 1982, some five (5) years before the Real Estate Division 
filed its action. The Findings of Fact adopted by the 
Administrative Law Judge at the adjudicative hearing also 
disclosed that all complained of actions of Juanita Taft Rogers 
occurred before November of 1982. Thus, petitioner, Juanita Taft 
Rogers respectfully moves this Court to enter an order reversing 
the ruling of the adjudicative hearing judge wherein he denied 
petitionees Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner further moves this 
court to remand this matter to the Division of Real Estate with 
instructions to dismiss the petition filed against Juanita Taft 
Rogers for suspension or revocation of her principal broker's 
license. 
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POINT II 
REVOCATION OF THE PRINCIPAL BROKERS LICENSE OF JUANITA TAFT ROGERS 
IS UNDULY HARSH AND INEQUITABLE. 
The Administrative Law Judge acknowledged in his Findings of 
Fact that Juanita Taft Rogers and Barbara Homeyer entered into a 
May 5, 1982 agreement which was written and signed. A copy of 
the agreement is set forth in the Appendix of this brief. 
Petitioner, Rogers, believes that Judge Eklund erroneously 
concluded that the May 5, 1982 agreement constituted a continuing 
Real Estate agreement. In the real estate business, when a 
broker or salesman enters into contractual relationships either 
with a buyer or seller, particularized forms of agreement are 
used. When dealing with a seller, a broker or agent of a broker 
traditionally enters into what is known as a "listing agreement." 
The "listing agreement" is a specific raemoralization of 
understanding between the parties authorizing the listing agent 
or broker to sell the property for a certain agreed upon 
compensation and for a specific period of time. When dealing 
with a buyer, a broker or sales agent typically and traditionally 
prepares for execution what is known as an "earnest money 
agreement." The "earnest money agreement" constitutes an offer 
and acceptance between a buyer and seller and sets forth the 
general terms anticipated to be incorporated into a final 
agreement of sale between the parties. The May 5, 1982 agreement 
is neither a "listing agreement" or an "earnest money agreement." 
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The May 5, 1982 agreement is solely and exclusively a contract 
between Barbara Homeyer and Juanita Taft Rogers authorizing the 
later to sell personal property (not real property) of Barbara 
Horaeyer and to hold in trust any sale proceeds received after the 
death of Barbara Horaeyer in the event she should meet an untimely 
death* Nowhere is there any mention that the proceeds from the 
sale of the personal property be utilized as a down payment or 
any kind of payment toward a real estate purchase. There is no 
limitation of time as is typical of listing agreements and there 
is no commission percentage set forth as is typical of listing 
agreements. Said document was drafted at the instance and in the 
presence of Mrs. Homeyer. The hearing court erroneously reasoned 
in its Conclusions of Law that 
if it were respondent's (Rogers) intent to effect a 
shift in her existing relationship with Mrs. Homeyer, 
it was incumbent upon respondent (Rogers) to utilize 
language clearly reflective of that intent, particularly 
when respondent had come into possession of Mrs. Homeyer Ts 
property as her agent in a real estate transaction, 
respondent had already disposed of some of that property, 
and it was anticipated that she would retain possession of 
the remaining property with the written authorization to 
liquidate it. 
The Court concluded that petitioner, Rogers, was in 
violation of one rule adopted by the Real Estate Division. Said 
Rule is Rule 9 (a)(7) which provides: 
All consideration received by a salesman in connection 
with a real estate transaction which he is engaged on 
behalf of his broker shall immediately be delivered by 
him to his broker.... 
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The Administrative Law Judge also concluded that Mrs* Rogers 
owed a fiduciary responsibility to Mrs. Homeyer although there 
was no statutory fiduciary responsibility set forth in the rules 
or regulations of the Division of Real Estate. The 
Administrative Law Judge acknowledged that there was no evidence 
that Juanita Taft Rogers had engaged in any misconduct since 
1982. The Administrative Law Judge finally concluded that the 
principal brokerfs license of Juanita Taft Rogers should be 
revoked and entered its recommended order accordingly. The Order 
of the court flies in the face of equity and justice. Even if 
one is to assume and conclude that all of the reasons given by 
the Administrative Law Judge in its conclusions of law are 
correct, an order of revocation of a principal broker's license 
cannot be viewed as anything but unreasonable, unjust and 
inequitable. Not one instance of improper conduct, impropriety, 
threat to the public or otherwise has been cited against Juanita 
Taft Rogers in the last seven (7) years. Assuredly, the Division 
of Real Estate has looked closely and has investigated the 
background of Mrs. Rogers and particularly her transactions as a 
Real Estate Broker or agent to determine whether or not any such 
impropriety exists. Nothing has been found. As a matter of 
fact, nothing is to be found. To allow a long period of time to 
pass during which no acts of impropriety are committed, but, on 
the other hand, professional responsibility has been discharged, 
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and then allow a license revocation for acts which have long 
since passed is on its face, inequitable and unduly harsh. Thus, 
Petitioner Rogers respectfully moves this court to reverse the 
revocation of her principal broker's license and remand the 
matter to the Division of Real Estate with instructions to either 
dismiss the proceedings or to impose alternative sanctions of 
much less severity. 
CONCLUSION 
The Division of Real Estate is barred by the Statute of 
Limitations contained within Section 78-12-25(2) Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended. More than five years lapsed from the time 
of any unlawful acts committed by petitioner Rogers to the time 
that the division of real estate filed its petition for license 
revocation. Because the acts complained of by the Division of 
Real Estate against petitioner Rogers occurred more than five 
years before the Petition filed in 1987 and more than seven years 
from this date, it is inequitable and unduly harsh to impose a 
license revocation of the principal broker's license of Juanita 
Taft Rogers. It is the position of Petitioner Rogers that the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge should be reversed and 
15 
that the case be remanded with instructions to dismiss the 
Petition and licensure proceedings against Juanita Taft Rogers. 
DATED this ZXQP2— day of March, 1989. 
GTS 
Attorney 
zz^v 
for/R« Respondent 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief to Mr. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 7k>&-
day of March, 1989. 
^ T W . Q^u)^h— 
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ADDENDUM 
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61-2-10 SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION 276 
of its political subdivisions, upon, or as a condition of, 
the privilege of conducting the business regulated by 
this chapter, except tha t a political subdivision 
within the state may charge a business license fee if 
the licensee mainta ins a place of business within the 
jurisdiction of the political subdivision. Unless other-
wise exempt, each licensee under this chapter is sub-
ject to all taxes imposed under Title 59. 1968 
61-2-10. Restriction on commiss ions — Affilia-
tion with more than one broker. 
It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales 
agent to accept valuable consideration for the perfor-
mance of any of the acts specified in this chapter from 
any person except the principal broker with whom he 
is affiliated and licensed. An inactive licensee is not 
authorised to conduct real estate transactions until 
he becomes affiliated with a licensed principal bro-
ker. No sales agent or associate broker may affiliate 
with more than one principal broker at the same 
time. Except as provided by rule, a principal broker 
may not be responsible for more than one real estate 
brokerage at the same time. 1967 
61-2-11. Revocat ion or suspension of l icense — 
Grounds — Subpoena power of divi-
sion. 
The division may investigate or cause to be investi-
gated the actions of any principal broker, associate 
broker, sales agent, prelicensing school, or school in-
structor licensed or certified by this state, or of any 
person who acts in any of those capacities within this 
state. The division is empowered to subpoena wit-
nesses, take evidence, and require by subpoena duces 
tecum the production of books, papers, contracts, 
records, other documents, or information considered 
relevant to the investigation. Each failure to respond 
to a subpoena is considered as a separate violation of 
this chapter. The commission, with the concurrence of 
the executive director of the Department of Business 
Regulation, may impose a civil penalty in an amount 
not to exceed $500 or suspend, revoke, place on proba-
tion, or deny issuance or reissuance of any license or 
the certification of a prelicensing school or instructor, 
if, at any time, the licensee or certificate holder, 
whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is 
found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(2) making any false promises of a character 
likely to influence, persuade, or induce; 
(3) pursuing a continued and flagrant course 
of misrepresentation, or of making false promises 
through agents, sales agents, advertising, or oth-
erwise; 
(4) acting for more than one party in a trans-
action without the knowledge of the other party; 
(5) acting as an associate broker or sales agent 
while not licensed with a licensed principal bro-
ker, representing or attempting to represent a 
broker other than the principal broker with 
whom he is affiliated, or representing as sales 
agent or having a contractual relationship simi-
lar to that of sales agent with other than a li-
censed principal broker; 
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to ac-
count for or to remit any monies coming into his 
possession which belong to others, or commin-
gling those funds with his own, or diverting those 
funds from the purpose for which they were re-
ceived; 
(7) paying or offering to pay valuable consider-
ation, as defined by the commission, to any per-
son not licensed under this chapter, except that 
valuable consideration may be shared with a li-
censed principal broker of another jurisdiction or 
as provided under the Professional Corporation 
Act; 
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a 
principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent 
in auch manner as to safeguard the interests of 
the public; 
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of all 
documents to all parties executing the docu-
ments; 
(10) failing to keep and make available for in-
spection by the division a record of each transac-
tion, including the names of buyers and sellers, 
the identification of the property, the sale price, 
any monies received in trust, any agreements or 
instructions from buyers or sellers, and any other 
information required by rule; 
(11) failing to disclose, in writing, in the pur-
chase or sale of property, whether the purchase 
or sale is made for himself or for an undisclosed 
principal; 
(12) conviction of a criminal offense involving 
moral turpitude; 
(13) advertising the availability of real estate 
or the services of a licensee in a false, misleading, 
or deceptive manner; 
(14) in the case of a principal broker or a li-
censee who is a branch manager, failing to exer-
cise reasonable supervision over the activities of 
his licensees and any unlicensed staff; 
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an 
order of the commission, or the rules adopted by 
the commission and the division; 
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a li-
censee to his principal in a real estate transac-
tion; 
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dis-
honest dealing; or 
(18) unprofessional conduct as defined by stat-
ute or rule. 1968 
61-2-12. Disciplinary action — Judicial rev iew. 
(1) (a) (i) Before imposing a civil penalty, revok-
ing, suspending, placing on probation, or 
denying issuance or reissuance of any li-
cense, the division shall give notice to the 
licensee and schedule an adjudicative pro-
ceeding. 
(ii) If the licensee is an active sales agent 
or active associate broker, the division shall 
inform the principal broker with whom the 
licensee is affiliated of the charge and of the 
time and place of the hearing. 
(iii) If, after the hearing, the commission 
determines that any licensee is guilty of a 
violation of this chapter, the license shall be 
suspended, revoked, or denied reissuance by 
written order of the commission in concur-
rence with the executive director. 
(b) If the hearing is delegated by the commis-
sion to an administrative law judge, and a ruling 
has been issued by the commission and the exec-
utive director, the licensee may request reconsid-
eration by filing a written request stating spe-
cific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
(c) Any applicant or licensee, or person ag-
grieved, including the complainant, may obtain 
judicial review of any adverse ruling, order, or 
decision of the executive director and the com-
mission. 
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(d) If the applicant or licensee prevails in the 
appeal and the court finds that the state action 
was undertaken without substantial justifica-
tion, the court may award reasonable litigation 
expenses to the applicant or licensee as provided 
under Chapter 27a, Title 78, Small Business 
Equal Access to Justice Act 
(e) (i) No order, rule, or decision of the execu-
tive director and the commission may take 
effect until 30 days after the time for appeal 
to the court has expired 
(u) If an appeal is taken by a licensee, the 
division shall stay enforcement of the com-
mission's action in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 63-46b-18 
(f) (I) When the notice of appeal is filed, the 
appellant shall file with the notice a $200 
bond for costs on appeal, conditioned to se-
cure the payment of costs if the appeal is 
dismissed or the judgment affirmed 
(n) The appellant shall request of the 
court, in writing, within two months after 
the issuance of the writ of certiorari, a date 
certain for the review hearing Appellant's 
failure to comply with the requirements of 
this subsection shall result in dismissal of 
the appeal with prejudice 
(2) The commission and the executive director 
shall comply with the procedures and requirements of 
Chapter 46b, Title 63, in their adjudicative proceed-
ings 1968 
61-2-13. Grounds for revocation of principal 
broker's license — Automatic 
inactivation of affiliated associate bro-
kers' and sales agents' licenses. 
(1) Any unlawful act or any violation of this chap-
ter committed by any real estate sales agent or asso-
ciate broker employed or engaged as an independent 
contractor by or on behalf of a licensed principal bro-
ker or committed by any employee, officer, or member 
of a licensed principal broker is cause for the revoca-
tion, suspension, or probation of the principal bro-
ke] 's license, or for the imposition of a fine against 
the principal broker in an amount not to exceed $500 
pez violation 
(2) The revocation or suspension of a principal bro-
kei license automatically inactivates every associate 
broker or sales agent license granted to those persons 
by reason of their affiliation with the principal broker 
whose license was revoked, pending a change of bro-
kei affiliation A principal broker shall, prior to the 
effective date of the suspension or revocation of his 
license, notify in writing every licensee affiliated 
with him of the revocation or suspension of his li-
cense 1968 
61-2-14. List of l icensees to be available. 
The division shall make available at reasonable 
cost a list of the names and addresses of all persons 
licensed by it under this chapter 1989 
61-2-15,61-2-16. Repealed. 1*73 
61-2-17. Penalty for violation of chapter. 
(1) Any individual violating this chapter, in addi-
tion to being subject to a license sanction or a fine 
ordered by the commission, is, upon conviction of a 
first violation, guilty of a class A misdemeanor, any 
imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed six 
months If the violator is a corporation, it is, upon 
conviction of a first violation, guilty of a class A mis 
demeanor Upon conviction of a second or subsequent 
violation, an individual is guilty of a third degree 
felony; imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed 
two years If a corporation is convicted of a second or 
subsequent violation, it is guilty of a third degree 
felony Any officer or agent of a corporation, or any 
member or agent of a partnership or association, who 
personally participates in or is an accessory to any 
violation of this chapter by such corporation, partner-
ship, or association, is subject to the penalties pre 
scribed for individuals 
(2) If any person receives any money or its equiva-
lent, as commission, compensation, or profit by or in 
consequence of a violation of this chapter, that person 
is liable for an additional penalty of not less than the 
amount of the money received and not more than 
three times the amount of money received, as may be 
determined by the court This penalty may be sued 
for in any court of competent jurisdiction, and recov-
ered by any person aggrieved for his own use and 
benefit 
(3) All fines imposed by the commission and the 
executive director pursuant to this chapter shall be 
deposited into the Real Estate Education, Research, 
and Recovery Fund to be used in a manner consistent 
with the requirements of the Real Estate Recovery 
Fund Act 1986 
61-2-18. Actions for recovery of compensat ion 
restricted. 
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action m 
any court of this state for the recovery of a commis-
sion, fee, or compensation for any act done or service 
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to 
other than licensed pnncipal brokers, unless the per-
son was duly licensed as a pnncipal broker at the 
time of the doing of the act or rendering the service 
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in 
his own name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or 
compensation for services as a sales agent or asso 
ciate broker unless the action is against the principal 
broker with whom he is or was licensed Any action 
for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other com-
pensation may only be instituted and brought by the 
principal broker with whom the sales agent or asso-
ciate broker is affiliated 1985 
61-2-19. Repealed. 1983 
61-2-20. Rights and privileges of sales agent, as-
sociate brokers, and principal brokers. 
Real estate licensees may fill out those forms ap 
proved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the 
attorney general and those forms provided by statute, 
with the following exceptions 
(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers 
may fill out any documents associated with the 
closing of a real estate transaction 
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real es 
tate forms prepared by legal counsel of the buyer, 
seller, lessor, or lessee, or any legal counsel, pro-
vided that the Real Estate Commission and at-
torney general have not approved a specific form 
necessary to that transaction 1985 
61-2-21. Remedies and action for violations. 
(1) (a) If the director has reason to believe that 
any person has been or is engaging in acts consti 
tuting violations of this chapter, and if it appears 
to the director that it would be in the public in 
terest to stop such acts, he shall issue and serve 
upon the person an order directing that person to 
cease and desist from those acts 
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(viii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief, 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings, 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section. 1968 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure [Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court], except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(0 the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
1868 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings by the district court or the re-
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or 
compensation only to the extent expressly autho-
rized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discre-
tion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of 
agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, 
if authorized by statute. 1867 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that: 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying 
the stay; or 
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely 
to prevail on the merits when the court 
finally disposes of the matter; 
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will 
suffer irreparable injury without immediate 
relief; 
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking 
review will not substantially harm other 
parties to the proceedings; and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, 
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not 
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's ac-
tion under the circumstances. 1987 
63-46b-19. Civil enforcement 
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by 
law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order 
by seeking civil enforcement in the district 
courts. 
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an 
agency's order must name, as defendants, each 
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks 
to obtain civil enforcement. 
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforce-
ment of an agency's order shall be determined by 
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Section 
78-12-27. Action against corporate stockholders or 
directors. 
78-12-28. Within two years. 
78-12-29. Within one year. 
78-12-30. Actions on claims against county, city or 
tOWtto 
78-12-31. Within six months. 
78-12-31.1. Habeas corpus — Three months. 
78-12-31.2. Post-conviction remedies — 30 days. 
78-12-32. Action on mutual account — When 
deemed accrued. 
78-12-33. Actions by state or other governmental 
entity. 
78-12-33.5. Statute of limitations — Asbestos dam-
ages — Action by state or governmen-
tal entity. 
78-12-34. Repealed. 
Article 3 
Miscel laneous Provis ions 
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state. 
78-12-36. Effect of disability. 
78-12-37. Effect of death. 
78-12-38. Effect of death of defendant outside this 
state. 
78-12-39. Effect of war. 
78-12-40. Effect of failure of action not on merits. 
78-12-41. Effect of injunction or prohibition. 
78-12-42. Disability must exist when right of ac-
tion accrues. 
78-12-43. All disabilities must be removed. 
78-12-44. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or 
promise to pay. 
78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred 
here. 
78-12-46. "Action" includes special proceeding. 
78-12-47. Separate trial of statute of limitations 
issue in malpractice actions. 
78-12-48. Statute of limitations — Asbestos dam-
ages. 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions 
generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the 
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of 
action has accrued, except in specific cases where a 
different limitation is prescribed by statute. 1967 
ARTICLE 1 
REAL PROPERTY 
78-12-2. Actions by the state. 
The state will not sue any person for or in respect to 
any real property, or the issues or profits thereof, by 
reason of the right or title of the state to the same, 
unless: 
(1) such right or title shall have accrued 
within seven years before any action or other 
proceeding for the same shall be commenced; or 
(2) the state or those from whom it claims 
shall have received the rents and profits of such 
real property, or some part thereof, within seven 
years. lwu 
78-12-3. Actions by patentees or grantees from 
state. 
No action can be brought for or in respect to real 
property by any person claiming under letters patent 
or a grant from this state, unless the same might 
have been commenced by the state as herein speci-
fied, in case such patent had not been issued or grant 
made. IMS 
78-12-4. When letters patent or grants declared 
void. 
When letters patent or grants of real property is-
sued or made by the state are declared void by the 
determination of a competent court, an action for the 
recovery of the property so conveyed may be brought 
either by the state, or by any subsequent patentee or 
grantee of the property, his heirs or assigns, within 
seven y e a n after such determination, but not after 
that period. IMS 
78-12-5. Seizure or possess ion within seven 
years necessary. 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the 
possession thereof shall be maintained, unless it ap-
pears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or pre-
decessor was seized or possessed of the property in 
question within seven years before the commence-
ment of the action. isss 
78-12-5.1. Seizure or possess ion within seven 
years — Proviso — Tax title. 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the 
possession thereof shall be maintained, unless the 
plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed of 
such property within seven years from the commence-
ment of such action; provided, however, that with re-
spect to actions or defenses brought or interposed for 
the recovery or possession of or to quiet title or deter-
mine the ownership of real property against the 
holder of a tax title to such property, no such action or 
defense shall be commenced or interposed more than 
four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, 
or transfer creating such tax title unless the person 
commencing or interposing such action or defense or 
his predecessor has actually occupied or been in pos-
session of such property within four years prior to the 
commencement or interposition of such action or de-
fense or within one year from the effective date of this 
amendment. iscs 
78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title — Limitations of 
action or defense — Proviso. 
No action or defense for the recovery or possession 
of real property or to quiet title or determine the own-
ership thereof shall be commenced or interposed 
against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of 
four years from the date of the sale, conveyance or 
transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly to 
any other purchase thereof at any public or private 
tax sale and after the expiration of one year from the 
date of this act. Provided, however, that this section 
shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of 
the legal title to such property where he or his prede-
cessor has actually occupied or been in actual posses-
sion of such property within four years from the com-
mencement or interposition of such action or defense. 
And provided further, that this section shall not bar 
any defense by a city or town, to an action by the 
holder of a tax title, to the effect that such city or 
town holds a lien against such property which is 
equal or superior to the claim of the holder of such tax 
title. INS 
78-12-5.3. Definitions of "tax title" and "action.*9 
(1) The term "tax title" as used in Section 
78-12-5.2 and Section 59-2-1364, and the related 
amended Sections 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, 
means any title to real property, whether valid or not, 
which has been derived through or is dependent upon 
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78-12-24. Actions against public officers — 
Within six years. 
An action by the state or any agency or public cor-
poration thereof against any public officer for malfea-
sance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office or 
against any surety upon his official bond may be 
brought within six years after such officer ceases to 
hold his office, but not thereafter. isss 
78-12-26. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in writ-
ing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and 
merchandise, and for any article charged on a 
store account; also on an open account for work, 
labor or services rendered, or materials fur-
nished; provided, that action in all of the forego-
ing cases may be commenced at any time within 
four years after the last charge is made or the 
last payment is received. 
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under 
the following sections of Chapter 6, Title 25, the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in spe-
cific situations limits the time for action to 
one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1). 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided 
for by law. isss 
78-12-25.5. Injury due to defective design or 
construction of improvement to real 
property — Within seven years. 
(1) (a) An action to recover damages for any injury 
to property, real or personal, or for any injury to 
the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition 
of an improvement to real property, or any action 
for damages sustained on account of the injury, 
may not be brought against any person perform-
ing or furnishing the design, planning, survey-
ing, supervising the construction of, or construct-
ing the improvement to real property more than 
seven years after the completion of construction. 
(b) In an action regarding property boundary 
surveys, the seven-year time period commences 
when the property survey is either recorded in 
the county recorder's office or filed in the county 
surveyor's office under Section 17-23-17. 
(2) The time limitation imposed by this section 
does not apply to any person in actual possession and 
control as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of the im-
provement at the time the defective and unsafe condi-
tion of the improvement constitutes the proximate 
cause of the injury for which an action is brought. 
(3) This section does not extend or limit the periods 
otherwise prescribed by state law for the bringing of 
any action. 
(4) As used in this section: 
(a) "Person" means an individual, corporation, 
partnership, or other legal entity. 
(b) "Completion of construction" means the 
date of issuance of a certificate of substantial 
completion by the owner, architect, engineer, or 
other agent, or the date of the owner's use or 
possession of the improvement on real property. 
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78-12-26. Within three years. 
Within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or 
injury to real property; except that when waste 
or trespass is committed by means of under-
ground works upon any mining claim, the cause 
of action does not accrue until the discovery by 
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such 
waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring 
personal property, including actions for specific 
recovery thereof; except that in all cases where 
the subject of the action is a domestic animal 
usually included in the term "livestock," which 
at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or 
brand, if the animal strayed or was stolen from 
the true owner without the owner's fault, the 
cause does not accrue until the owner has actual 
knowledge of such facts as would put a reason-
able man upon inquiry as to the possession of the 
animal by the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud 
or mistake; except that the cause of action in 
such case does not accrue until the discovery by 
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the 
fraud or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by the stat-
utes of this state, other than for a penalty or for-
feiture under the laws of this state, except where 
in special cases a different limitation is pre-
scribed by the statutes of this state. 
(5) An action to enforce liability imposed by 
Section 78-17-3, except that the cause of action 
does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows 
or reasonably should know of the harm suffered. 
1986 
78-12-27. Action against corporate stockholders 
or directors. 
Actions against directors or stockholders of a corpo-
ration to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to 
enforce a liability created, by law must be brought 
within three years after the discovery, by the ag-
grieved party, of the facts upon which the penalty or 
forfeiture attached, or the liability accrued, and in 
case of actions against stockholders of a bank pursu-
ant to levy of assessment to collect their statutory 
liability, such actions must be brought within three 
years after the levy of the assessment. isss 
78-12-28. Within two years. 
Within two years, an action: 
(1) against a marshal, sheriff, constable, or 
other officer upon a liability incurred by the do-
ing of an act in his official capacity, and in virtue 
of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, 
including the nonpayment of money collected 
upon an execution; but this section does not ap-
ply to an action for an escape; 
(2) for recovery damages for the death of one 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another; 
or 
(3) for injury to the personal rights of another 
as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 1987 
78-12-29. Within one year. 
Within one year: 
(1) An action for liability created by the stat-
utes of a foreign state. 
(2) An action upon a statute for a penalty or 
forfeiture where the action is given to an individ-
ual, or to an individual and the state, except 
when the statute imposing it prescribes a differ-
ent limitation. 
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(3) An action upon a statute, or upon an un-
dertaking in a criminal action, for a forfeiture or 
penalty to the state. 
(4) An action for libel, slander, assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment, or seduction. 
(5) An action against a sheriff or other officer 
for the escape of a prisoner arrested or impris-
oned upon either civil or criminal process. 
(6) An action against a municipal corporation 
for damages or injuries to property caused by a 
mob or riot. 
(7) A claim for relief or a cause of action under 
the following sections of Chapter 6, Title 25, the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(lXa), which in spe-
cific situations limits the time for action to 
four years, under Section 25-6-10; or 
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2). isss 
78-12-30. Actions on claims against county, city 
or town. 
Actions on claims against a county, city or incorpo-
rated town, which have been rejected by the board of 
county commissioners, city commissioners, city coun-
cil or toard of trustees, as the case may be, must be 
commenced within one year after the first rejection 
thereof by such board of county or city commis-
sioners, city council or board of trustees. isss 
78-12-31. Within six months. 
Within six months: 
An /action against an officer, or an officer de facto: 
(1) to recover any goods, wares, merchandise 
oi' other property seized by any such officer in his 
official capacity as tax collector, or to recover the 
price or value of any goods, wares, merchandise 
or other personal property so seized, or for dam-
ages for the seizure, detention, sale of, or injury 
to, any goods, wares, merchandise or other per-
sonal property seized, or for damages done to any 
person or property in making any such seizure. 
(2) for money paid to any such officer under 
protest, or seized by such officer in his official 
capacity, as a collector of taxes, and which, it is 
claimed, ought to be refunded. isss 
78-12-31.1. H a b e a s corpus — Three months. 
Within three months: 
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. 
This limitation shall apply not only as to grounds 
known to petitioner but also to grounds which in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
been known by petitioner or counsel for peti-
tioner. 1979 
78-12-31.2. Post-convict ion remedies — 30 days . 
Within 30 days: 
No post-conviction remedies may be applied for 
or entertained by any court within 30 days prior 
to the date set for execution of a capital sentence, 
unless the grounds therefor are based on facts or 
circumstances which developed or first became 
known within that period. 1979 
78-12-32. Act ion on mutual account — When 
d e e m e d accrued. 
In an action brought to recover a balance due upon 
a mutual, open and current account, where there 
have been reciprocal demands between the parties, 
the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued 
from the time of the last item proved in the account 
on either side. isss 
78-12-33. Act ions b y state or other governmen-
tal entity. 
The limitations in this article apply to actions 
brought in the name of or for the benefit of the state 
or other governmental entity, the same as to actions 
by private parties, except under Section 78-12-33.5. 
1988 
78-12-33.5. Statute of limitations — Asbestos 
damages — Action by state or govern-
mental entity. 
(l)(a) No statute of limitations or repose may bar 
an action by the state or other governmental en-
tity to recover damages from any manufacturer 
of any construction materials containing asbes-
tos, when the action arises out of the manufac-
turer's providing the materials, directly or 
though other persons, to the state or other gov-
ernmental entity or to a contractor on behalf of 
the state or other governmental entity. 
(b) Subsection (a) provides for actions not yet 
barred, and also acts retroactively to permit ac-
tions under this section that are otherwise 
barred. 
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means 
asbestiform varieties of: 
(a) chrysotile (serpentine); 
(b) crocidolite (riebeckite); 
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite); 
(d) anthophyllite; 
(e) tremolite; or 
(f) actinolite. isss 
78-12-34. Repealed. issi 
ARTICLE 3 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state. 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person 
when he is out of the state, the action may be com-
menced within the term as limited by this chapter 
after his return to the state. If after a cause of action 
accrues he departs from the state, the time of his 
absence is not part of the time limited for the com-
mencement of the action. 1987 
78-12-36. Effect of disability. 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than 
for the recovery of real property, is at the time the 
cause of action accrued, either under the age of major-
ity or mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the action. 
1987 
78-12-37. Effect of death. 
If a person entitled to bring an action dies before 
the expiration of the time limited for the commence-
ment thereof, and the cause of action survives, an 
action may be commenced by his representatives af-
ter the expiration of that time and within one year 
from his death. If a person against whom an action 
may be brought dies before the expiration of the time 
limited for the commencement thereof and the cause 
of action survives, an action may be commenced 
against the representatives after the expiration of 
that time and within one year after the issue of let-
ters testamentary or of administration. 1968 
78-12-38. Effect of death of defendant outside 
this state. 
If a person against whom a cause of action exists 
UU^1 c<u. ^ ^ (Xx>'f 
/^ir i/&f / 
c 
5 May, 1982 
Provo, Utah 
re: The inherited items in the personal estate of Barbara Eiseniiand llomeyer 
All items in the above mentioned estate are assigned for sale &/or cxctiangu 
to the personal agent to Barbara Eisenhand Homcyer, Ms. Juaiita Taft Rogers. 
Said agent, in the event Barbara Eiseniiand Homeyer's death occurs before 
the entire estate is liquidated, will put the miftining funds into a trust 
for the minor children: Gerald William Honuyer, born 8 January, 1970 and 
Richard Edward Homeyer, b o m 21 September, 1972, to be given to them en 
their eighteenth birthdays. Said trust is to be so established or designated 
either by a court appointed trustee; a representative traa the Division of 
Family Services; or a member of the existing Bishopric <S/or Stake Presidency. 
JSai£ designated trust representative will make all decisions with the review 
"and approval of Ms. Betxy Jean Ityrd, personal family representative. 
Ihe existing personal residence of Barbara Eisenhand llomeyer is located at 
3*+5 South m-50 East; Provo, Utah 9*601. 
Ms. Uurbara bisunhond llonryor 
r-
,« #** ^ ' /J T 
Mj/^KiuiUta Taft l to^rs-^uiUf^r 
rited estate of M^^ ilotDuy^ r 
11 Locust Lane 
Provo, Utah 8MCh 
Ms.LBetty J ^ B 
. - - tea*. 
s. ^ah 3yrd, Witifess 
Bae original of this docunent i s In the posession of Juanita Taft Rogers, agent 
to Ms. Barbara Eisenhand Hooeyer. 
cc: Ms. Betty Jean fyrd; 386 South mjO East; Provo, Utah 8^601 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
RICHARD M. MERCER, DIRECTOR 
PO BOX 45802 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145 
TELEPHONE: (801) 530-6747 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
In the Matter of PETITION 
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS to Act 
as a Real Estate Principal Broker CASE NO. RE87-08-02 
The Division of Real Estate of the Department of Business 
Regulation of the State of Utah (the Division), by and through 
Its Director, Richard M. Mercer, upon knowledge and belief, hereby 
complains and alleges as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The cause of action was Investigated by the Division upon 
complaints that Juanlta Taft Rogers (Rogers) has engaged In acts and 
practices which constitute violations of Utah Code Annotated Section 
61-2-1, et seq. (1953, as amended). 
JURISDICTION 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 provides that the Utah 
Real Estate Commission may suspend or revoke the Real Estate license of 
any salesagent or broker who, while engaging In acts for which such a 
license Is required, Is found guilty of: 
a. M..*(6) Falling within a reasonable time, to account 
for or to remit any monies coming Into his possession which belong to 
others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting those 
funds from the purpose for which they were received;-
b. "..,(8) Being unworthy or Incompetent to act as a 
principal broker, associate broker, or salesagent In such manner as to 
safeguard the Interests of the public;" 
c. "•..(15) Violating or disregarding this chapter, an order 
of the Commission, or the Rules adopted by the Commission and the 
Division. 
d. "...(18) Breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to 
his principal In a real estate transaction. 
2. Rogers Is a real estate principal broker duly licensed by the 
State of Utah under License No. PB 14700. 
3. At all times material to this action, Rogers was acting in her 
capacity as a real estate licensee. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
4. In January, 1982, Rogers was a salesagent affiliated with 
principal broker David R. Harman. On September 1, 1982, she terminated 
her affiliation with Harman and became affiliated with principal 
broker A.J. Michaels. In late 1982 or early 1983, she terminated her 
affiliation with Michaels and became affiliated with K.M. Wool ley & 
Company. Rogers' license was suspended from September 15, 1985 through 
September 15, 1986, and placed on probation from September 15, 1986 
through September 15, 1988, as a result of case #1737, which Involved 
a 1981-1982 real estate transaction. Rogers obtained a license as a 
principal broker on January 15, 1987. 
5. In or about January, 1982, Homeyer and Rogers orally agreed 
that Homeyer would give Rogers some Inherited personal property to 
hold. Rogers was to find a seller of a home who would accept personal 
property Instead of cash for a down payment. If such a seller could 
not be found, Rogers was to arrange for the sale of some of the 
property to generate cash for a down payment. If a sale was 
consummated, Rogers would receive some of the personal property In an 
amount equal to a 6% commission. 
6. During February and March, 1982, Homeyer delivered numerous 
Items of personal property to Rogers, who stored It In two storage 
units owned by a Mr. Miller. Miller had listed the storage units for 
sale with Rogers. 
7. A seller who was willing to take personal property was 
not found. On or about May 5, 1982, Homeyer gave Rogers written 
authorization to liquidate the property. 
8. Rogers sold a number of Items for a total of $4,495.00 which 
had a fair market value of $6,530.50. Rogers did not deliver the sale 
proceeds to her principal broker to hold In trust for Homeyer. Rogers 
gave possession of certain Items valued at $6,799.50 to various 
Individuals with Instructions to repair, restore, or appraise the 
Items. 
9. In or about July, 1982, Homeyer orally demanded that Rogers 
give her the proceeds of the sales and return the balance of the 
personal property which had not been sold. In July, 1982 and on 
October 29, 1982, Homeyer's attorneys demanded that Rogers return 
all property still held, and account for all property which had been 
transferred, sold, or disposed of by Rogers. Rogers refused to comply 
until ordered to do so by court order In July, 1986. 
10. Rogers did not turn over to Homeyer the $4,495.00 In proceeds 
from the sale of Items, nor did she retrieve the $6,799.50 worth of 
items which had been given to others to repair, restore, or appraise. 
In addition, Rogers still had In her possession or had otherwise 
disposed of other Items valued at $4,820.50. 
11. On October 30, 1986, Homeyer obtained a Judgment In the 
amount of $18,150.00 against Rogers based on conversion of personal 
property and sale proceeds and on breach of fiduciary duty. After the 
Judgment was entered, Rogers converted her Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which 
had been pending since 1981, to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Homeyer has 
filed a $10,000.00 claim against the Real Estate Recovery Fund. 
COUNT I 
12. The Division realleges and Incorporates by reference Its 
allegations set forth In paragraphs No. 1 through 11 as If spec I flea II; 
set out herein. 
13. Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (1953, as amended), 
provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked If the 
licensee Is found guilty of: "...(6) Falling within a reasonable time, 
to account for or to remit any monies coming Into his possession which 
belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting 
those funds from the purpose for which they were received;" 
14. As outlined above, Rogers sold Items of personal property anc 
received $4,495.00, which she did not remit to Homeyer or account for. 
Rogers commingled the funds with her own and expended them. 
15. The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (6) as amended. 
COUNT I I 
16. The Division realleges and Incorporates by reference Its 
allegations set forth In paragraphs No. 1 through 15 as If specifically 
set out herein. 
17. Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (1953, as amended), 
provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked If 
licensee Is found guilty of: "...(8) Being unworthy or Incompetent 
to act as a principal broker, associate broker, or salesagent In such 
manner as to safeguard the Interests of the public;" 
18. As outlined above, Rogers received personal property 
from Homeyer which was to be used In connection with a real estate 
transaction, and failed to safeguard the property. Numerous Items were 
delivered to parties who did not return them. Other Items were kept by 
Rogers or otherwise dissipated. Additional Items were sold by Rogers 
below market value. Rogers did not give the sales proceeds to her 
principal broker to hold In trust or to Homeyer. 
19. The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (8) as amended. 
COUNT I I i 
20. The Division realleges and Incorporates by reference Its 
allegations set forth In paragraphs No. 1 through 19 as if specifically 
set out herein. 
21. Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (1953, as amended), 
provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked If the 
licensee is found guilty of: "...(16) Breaching a fiduciary duty owed 
by a licensee to his principal In a real estate transaction." 
22. As outlined above, Homeyer entrusted Rogers with personal 
property In connection with a proposed real estate transaction. Rogers 
failed to protect the property, and refused to return It to Homeyer 
when requested to do so. Rogers sold a number of Items at below market 
value and kept the proceeds. 
23. The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (16) as amended. 
COUNT IV 
24. The Division realleges and Incorporates by reference Its 
allegations set forth In paragraphs No. 1 through 23 as If specifically 
set out herein. 
26. Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (1953, as amended), 
provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked If 
the licensee Is found guilty of: "...(15) Violating or disregarding 
this chapter, an Order of the Commission, or the Rules adopted by the 
Commission and the Division." 
26. Rule 4.2, adopted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 5.5 
(1953, as amended), requires that all funds received by a licensee In 
a real estate transaction must be delivered to the principal broker and 
deposited In the broker's trust account within three banking days. 
27. As outlined above, Rogers sold Homeyer's personal property 
to generate funds for a down payment on a real estate purchase, but dl 
not deliver the proceeds to her principal broker for deposit Into the 
broker's real estate trust account. 
28. The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Rule 
4.2 and Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (15) as amended. 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1. That Rogers be adjudged and decreed to have engaged In the 
acts alleged herein. 
2. That by engaging In the above acts, Rogers be adjudged and 
decreed to be guilty of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 
61-2-11 (6), (8), (16), and (16) (1953, as amended). 
3. That Rogers license to act as a real estate licensee be 
suspended or revoked accordingly. 
DATED this ^J7 day of A/0~ZLf<4e4&6' 1987. 
•&*ntJ//Ufct 
RICHARD M. MERCER, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Appeared before me this 25ffc^ day of NCrue/rylofc^* 1987, 
, who deposes and says that the Information listed above Is true to the 
best of his knowledge and belief. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
fr.yqi 
Res I d I ng a t : ^Jit {JJ&L. U+y. , UUfrUL^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing 
document upon Juanlta Taft rogers by mailing a copy thereof, properly 
addressed, wifh nrt«4-»«^ .«...-.-.-t-> *-- — -
A copy of the foregoing document has been mailed this day prepaid 
to Gary Weight, attorney for Juanlta Taft Rogers, at Aldrlch, Nelson, 
Weight & Esplln, P.O. Box L, Provo, Utah 84603. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 
1987. 
SIGNATURE 
SKW87-08-02-P 
L clay of Qjb&srrJUA- . 
A—7. <7B 
T I I D P ( 
BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the license of Joanita Taft Rogers 
to act as a Real Estate Principal Broker 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
CaseNo.RE-87-08-02 
Appearances: 
Sheila Page for the Division of Real Estate 
Gary H. Weight for Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on September 20,1988 before J. Steven 
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for theDepartment of Business Regulation. Thereafter, certain 
preliminary motions were presented by respective counseL 
Based thereon, Counts I and HI act forth in the Petition, dated November 25,1987, were dismissed, 
Further, Count IV was amended to reflect die rule to be properly designated therein. Respondent's motions 
to dismiss the insert, proceeding on the basis that the hearing should be conducted by the Commission 
rather than the Administrative Law Judge and that the Division should be estopped to take any action on 
Respondent's license were denied 
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received The Administrative Law Judge, being fully in the 
premises, now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Sometime in 1973, Respondent became licensed as a sales agent by the Division of Real 
Estate. As relevant herein, Respondent was affiliated with prindpal broker David R. Hannan as of January 
1982. On September 1,1982, she terminated her affiliation with Mr. Hannan and became affiliated with 
principal broker A. J. Michaels. In late 1982 or early 1983, she tenninated ber affiliation with Mr. 
Michaels and became affiliated with K. M. Woolley & Company. 
2. By Order, dated August 17,1983, Respondent's license was suspended for one year and 
thereafter placed on probation for two years, subject to certain terms and conditions. Said order was based 
on conduct which occurred between December 10,1981 and August 22,1982. Respondent's conduct in that 
regard was found to constitute gross incompetence and a violation of die fiduciary duty owed to h a clients 
in that transaction. Respondent subsequently became licensed as a principal broker on January 15,1987. 
3. In January 1982, a Barbara Homeyer contacted Respondent to obtain her services in purchasing 
a home. Ms. Homeyer, who was recently divorced, resided in a home jointly owned by herself and her ex-
husband. Since there had been no property settlement relative to her divorce and Ms. Homeyer's ex-husband 
was reluctant to cooperate as to the sale of their home, the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer to provide 
a down payment on the purchase of another home consisted of various items of inherited personal property. 
4. During January 1982, Ms. Homeyer and Respondent entered into a verbal agreement, whereby 
Respondent was to act as Ms. Homeyer's real estate agent and attempt to find a prospective seller who 
would accept Ms. Homeyer's personal property as down payment for the purchase of a home. On February 
21f 1982, Respondent and Ms. Homeyer inventoried her property. Ms. Homeyer then delivered that 
property to Respondent, which was held in storage under Respondent's control. The property was so 
transferred to Respondent as the means to provide a safe place for its storage and facilitate Respondent's 
access to that property if a prospective seller was located. 
5. Between February and late-April 1982, Respondent and Ms. Homeyer identified at least two 
properties for possible purchase. In one instance, an agreement could not be reached as to those items of 
Ms. Homeyer's personal property which wouM be a c ^ When it 
became apparent to Ms. Homeyer that no other purchase on the above-described terms would be realized, she 
authorized Respondent to sell certain items as the means to provide cash for die down payment necessary to 
purchase a home. 
6. During March and April 1982, Respondent had some of Ms. Homeyer's property appraised and 
certain items were sold in antique shows. However, as of late April 1982, no progress in locating a 
suitable home had been realized, Ms. Homeyer had received no monies from Respondent relative to the sale 
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of some of her property and Respondent had taken certain property from storage and sold it without Ms. 
Homeyer*s authorization. Further, Respondent never advised her principal broker of her activities nor did 
she deliver to him any of the funds she obtained from the sale of Ms. Homeyer's property. 
7. In late-April or early May 1982, Ms. Homeyer underwent foot surgery and was advised that her 
condition could be cancerous. At the time, it was unknown if a suitable home would be found and whether 
that would occur prior to her possible death. On May 5,1982, Ms. Homeyer met with Respondent and 
they executed a written agreement, whereby the former assigned all of her personal property to Respondent 
for sale and/or exchange and authorized Respondent to liquidate that property. The agreement further 
provided that if all property held by Respondent was not liquidated prior to Ms. Homeyer's death, the 
remaining funds would be placed in trust for the benefit of her two minor children. 
8. During the next two months, Ms. Homeyer was never advised as to the status of her property 
and was unable to contaa Respondent in that regard. In mid-July 1982, Ms. Homeyer retained counsel and 
made written demand that Respondent return all personal property in her possession and provide an 
accounting as to the sale or other disposition of the remaining property which had been in her possession. 
9. By letter, dated October 21,1982, Respondent generally informed Ms. Homeyer as to efforts 
which had been undertaken to appraise, restore and/or sell some of the property in her possession. 
Respondent further mentioned various costs incurred as to the appraisal and restoration of that property. 
Respondent also reiterated that her efforts had been undertaken to produce funds necessary for a down 
payment for a home or condominium, but she acknowledged that no suitable residence had yet been 
identified. Respondent requested Ms. Homeyer to keep her posted "about what you want to do with the 
housing thing** and she advised Ms. Homeyer of a listing for a two bedroom townhouse duplex and pondered 
that Ms. Homeyer could live in one side and rent the other. 
10. By letter, dated October 28,1982, Ms. Homeyer advised Respondent that purchase of the 
duplex would not be economically feasible and reiterated that no accounting had been received as to the 
status of her property or any disposition thereof. By letter, dated October 29,1982, a second demand was 
made that Respondent return all items of personal property entrusted to her. When compliance with that 
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demand was not forthcoming, Ms. Homeyer initiated litigation. No accounting was provided to Ms. 
Homeyer until July 9,1986, when Respondent returned certain items pursuant to a writ of replevin. 
11. By Stipulation, dated October 7,1986, Ms. Homeyer and Respondent identified the status of 
some of the property which had been in Respondent's possession. That property consisted of guns, 
cameras, furs, clocks and watches, a coin coUectin, sU 
household and other miscellaneous items. The value of the property which Respondent sold was agreed to 
have been $6,530.30 and Respondent received $4,495.00 from the sale of that property. It was agreed that 
certain property, valued at $6,79930, was delivered by Respondent to third parties and that said property had 
not been recovered by Ms. Homeyer. It was also agreed that certain property still in Respondent's 
possession should be valued at $4,82030. 
12. Some of the property which Ms. Homeyer had delivered to Respondent was subsequently 
returned to her. However, in Fmdings of Faa and Conclusions of Law, dated October 30,1986, the Court 
concluded that Respondent had sold some of the property below fair market value, had interfered with Ms. 
Homeyers possession and control of some of the property by intentionally refusing to return it and had 
converted the proceeds from the sale of some of the property to her own use. By reason thereof, the Court 
entered judgment on October 30,1986 in favor of Ms. Homeyer totalling $2,035.50 as a result of 
Respondent's breach of contractual and fiduciary duties to Ms. Homeyer, $4,495.00 as a result of 
Respondent's conversion of proceeds from the sale of the property, $6,799.50 as a result of Respondent's 
conversion of property upon transferring that property to others and $4,820.50 as a result of Respondent's 
conversion of property still in her possession. 
13. In the above-referenced Findings ofFact, the Court also noted that Ms. Homeyer had initiated 
bankruptcy preoceedings on July 22,1985 and that Respondent had been listed as a creditor in said 
proceedings. The Counfurther noted that an order was entered in those proceedings on October 30,1985, 
whereby Ms. Homeyer was discharged of all claims, including those of Respondent relative to expenses she 
incurred in her efforts to repair, restore and dispose of Ms. Homeyers property. The instant record also 
reflects that Respondent initiated bankruptcy proceedings in 1981 and that after entry of the October 30, 
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1986 Judgment, an order was entered in those bankmpty proceedings relative to Respondent, whereby the 
just-stated Judgment was discharged. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondent urges that her May 5,1982 agreement with Ms. Homeyer terminated the real estate 
agem^rincipal relationship which had previously existed between them. Respondent further asserts that her 
subsequent conduct pursuant to that contract had no relevance respecting her status as a licensed sales agent 
and provides no basis upon which to enter a sanction as to that licensure. Respondent further urges that 
there is no proper basis to now conclude she is incompetent or unworthy to practice as a principal broker, 
inasmuch as whatever occurred prior to May 5,1982 does not reflect either a continuing or presently 
existing pattern of misconduct 
Section 61-2-119 Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, provides that a real estate license may 
be suspended or revoked if the licensee is found guilty of : 
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker, associated broker, or 
sales agent in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public; 
• * * * * 
(IS) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of the commission, or the rules 
adopted by the commission and the division. 
Rule 9(a)(7) further provides: 
All consideration received by a salesman in connection with a real estate transaction 
in which he is engaged on behalf of his broker shall immediately be delivered by him to his 
broker 
Upon a considered review of the conflicting evidence presented. Respondents assertion that the 
May 5,1982 agreement transformed what had been a real estate transaction between a principal and an agent 
to that of a contract between private parties is not well founded. The May 5,1982 agreement does not 
reference the previously existing relationship between Ms. Homeyer and Respondent and, importantly, does 
not explicitly tever or alter that relationship. If it were Respondent's intent to effect a shift in her existing 
relationship with Ms. Homeyer, it was incumbent upon Respondent to utilize language clearly reflective of 
that intent, particularly when Respondent had come into possession of Ms. Homeyer s property as her agent 
in a real estate transaction, Respondent had already disposed of some of that property, and it was anticipated 
that she would retain possession of the remaining property with the written authorization to liquidate it 
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Nothing in the May 5,1986 agreement reflects that Ms. Homeyer no longer desired to obtain 
another home or that Respondent would no longer attempt to locate a home for Ms. Homeyer. 
Significantly, Respondent's efforts in that regard did not cease after that agreement was executed. To the 
contrary. Respondent acknowledged in her subsequent correspondence with Ms. Homeyer that continuing 
efforts to locate a home had been made. As of October 21,1982, possibilities in that regard were still 
being explored. Simply put, the May 5, 1982 agreement did not change the relationship between Ms. 
Homeyer and Respondent as it relates to the purpose for which possession of Ms. Homeyer's property was 
initially transferred to Respondent Thus, the manner in which Respondent disposed of that property is a 
matter properly congizable by the Commission as to whether any basis exists to enter a sanction on 
Respondent's licensure as a real estate principal broker. 
Concededly, the transaction under review occurred approximately six years ago and there is no 
evidence that Respondent has engaged in any misconduct since that time. Nevertheless, a violation of 
Section 61-2-11(8) may be established upon sufficient evidence of aggravated misconduct by a licensee 
during the course of a single real estate transaction. The instant record clearly reflects that Respondent held, 
sold or otherwise disposed of Ms. Homeyer's property in a manner entirely inconsistent with Ms. 
Homeyer's interest in that property. In certain instances. Respondent acted without authorization from Ms. 
Homeyer and failed to safeguard the latter's interest in the property which had been entrusted to her. 
Although Respondent's conduct was not governed by an statutorily mandated fiduciary duty between herself 
and Ms. Homeyer, Respondent clearly owed such a duty as a sales agent to Ms. Homeyer throughout the 
time under review and she Med to properly discharge that duty. 
In addition to Respondent's breach of the fiduciary duty which she owed to Ms. Homeyer, 
Respondent failed to deliver to her principal broker the consideration she received from die sale of Ms. 
Homeyer's property. Thus, Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(15) and Rule 9(a)(7) relative thereto. 
Furthermore, Respondent knew that she had been given the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer which 
could be used to effect the purchase of another home. Without explanation, Respondent failed to account 
for those assets when repeated requests to do so had been made between July 1982 and October 1982, yet 
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she ostensibly held herself out to Ms. Homeyer as being willing to continue to assist in the search for a 
home. 
Arguably, the agreement between Ms. Homeyer and Respondent was somewhat unique and 
Respondent may have engaged in relatively unconventional efforts in her attempt to obtain a home for Ms. 
Homeyer. Respondent may also have encountered unforeseen difficulties in liquidating the property to 
generate cash and in her on-going relationship with Ms. Homeyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
Respondent should have consistently acted in Ms. Homeyer's best interests and there is simply no evidence 
that she did so. To the contrary, the egregious nature of Respondent's misconduct operated to produce 
substantial financial harm to Ms. Homeyer. Based thereon, and given the disciplinary sanction which was 
entered in 1983, an appropriately severe sanction should now enter as to Respondent's licensure. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate principal 
broker be revoked, said revocation to become effective consistent with the provisions of Section 61-2-
12(1X0. 
Dated this, of December, 1988. 
7 
ORDER 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Recommended Order are accepted as written. It Is hereby 
ordered that the Utah real estate license of Juanlta Taft 
Rogers will be revoked effective February 14, 1989. 
Dated this K-+K day of kgCiL«y\h£r- 1988. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE/COMMISSION 
MA 
s^cca 
FREDRICK FROERER, I I I 
fnJltZf^kAn^^ 
WILLVAM H. COLEMAN 
QtJ 
PAUL NEUEfsTStHWANDER 
The above Order Is confirmed and approved by the 
undersigned this \S day of yw^^
 f 1988* 
WILLIAM E. DUNN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
